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FOREWORD 
The frisk search for weapons is one of the most 
important rights of police officers ever recognized by 
the United States Supreme Court. It was established 
early in our law that a police officer could lawfully 
search a person under arrest for any crime •.. for 
evidence and weapons ..• but it was not until 1968, in 
a case entitled Terry v. Ohio, 20 Led 2d 889, that the 
Supreme Court stated that there were other circum-
stancys short of arrest or probable cause for arrest, 
in which a limited search for weapons was justified 
for the protection of the officer and others. The 
right to a frisk search should be known thoroughly by 
every officer. It could save his life. 
Another important criminal conviction has been 
reversed because the issuing judge and the investigat-
ing police officer did not know the simple requirements 
of an informer affidavit in a search warrant. Statev. 
Harrell (SC, filed March 21, 1974). That decision is 
discussed and explained in this handbook. A simple 
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rule is set forth to insure that informer affidavits 
are sufficient. 
Julius B. Ness 
Associate Justice-Elect 
South Carolina Supreme Court 
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THE COMMON LAW CRIMES 
MURDER 
Some crimes for which a person might be convicted 
in the courts of the State are not set out in our 
State Code of Laws. They come from the common law of 
England, as does the basic law of most of the states 
of the United States. An exception to this rule is 
Louisiana, which was settled first by the French and, 
as a result, based its system of laws on those of 
France •.• known as the Napoleonic Code. Louisiana has 
no common law. 
Murder .•• one of the common law crimes ..• is defined 
in our State Code of Laws, and the penalty for convic-
tion is set out also, but nowhere therein will there 
appear a statement that murder is unlawful. That fact 
is established as part of the common law. 
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NOTES FROM WHARTON'S CRIMINAL 
LAW AND PROCEDURE ... ANDERSON 
DEFINITION 
Murder is the (1) felonious (2) killing (3) of a 
human being (4) by another (5) with malice aforethought. 
When a statute merely declares the punishment for 
murder but does not define it, the common law deter-
mines the meaning of the offense. 
MALICE AFORETHOUGHT 
A felonious killing is murder when the defendant 
has acted with malice aforethought. In the absence of 
malice aforethought, the offense is merely manslaughter. 
The division of murder into statutory degrees does not 
affect the requirement of malice aforethought, since 
it is necessary to show that there has been a murder 
before its degree is determined. In some states the 
requirement of malice has been abandoned. 
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Malice aforethought cannot be given a literal 
interpretation and has acquired a strictly technical 
definition and comprehends a number of different 
conditions of mind. It is said to include all those 
states and conditions of mind which accompany a 
homicide committed without legal excuse or extenuation. 
Malice aforethought may be regarded as the mental state 
of a person voluntarily doing an act which ordinarily 
will cause serious injury or death to another without 
excuse or justification. While actual hatred or 
enmity may be present, malice is not limited in its 
meaning to hatred, ill will, or malevolence. Moreover, 
malice aforethought may exist although there is no 
particular enmity or ill will toward the victim and 
even though there is no specific intent to take 
human life. 
If the defendant had voluntarily committed an act 
which in the ordinary course of events would or might 
cause death or serious bodily harm, he is liable for 
murder although he did not actually intend that death 
should follow. Accordingly, if the defendant intended 
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-only to inflict a severe beating on or to maim the 
victim, an unintended death which results is murder 
for which the defendant is responsible. Under this 
principle it has been held that a defendant is 
responsible for murder when his attempt to produce 
a miscarriage by violent methods caused the death of 
the woman. If there was no intent to inflict a severe 
injury on the woman, or if the death was due solely to 
the defendant's negligence, he is not liable for murder. 
If a person discharges a firearm intentionally 
without a specific intent to inflict injury, but under 
such circumstances as to evince a heart regardless of 
social duty, and the act naturally tends to and does 
destroy human life, it is murder. Hence, if a person 
intentionally discharges a firearm into a crowd of 
people, with a disregard of consequences, and death 
results therefrom, or into a dwelling house in which 
he has reason to believe there are people living, 
thereby killing a person therein, though without 
intention to kill or injure anybody, he is guilty of 
murder. Likewise, if a person intentionally discharges 
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a firearm into a railroad train, thereby killing a 
person, though without intention to injure anyone, he 
is guilty of murder. It has even been held that if 
one points a loaded gun and discharges it, but not in 
the direction of a person who is in fact killed by the 
bullet reaching his person, glancing from another 
object, he is yet guilty of a homicidal offense, if 
he knew, or ought reasonably to have known, that his 
conduct was dangerous to human life and yet he acted 
regardless thereof. 
In a number of states statutes declare that an 
unauthorized killing is murder "when done in the 
commission of an act imminently dangerous to others, 
and evidencing a depraved heart, regardless of human 
life, although without any premeditated design to effect 
the death of any particular individual". Some states 
hold that this provision is not applicable unless it can 
be shown that the accused acted from universal malice 
and that the act causing death had imperiled the lives 
of many persons other than the actual victim. Thus a 
defendant is not guilty under this provision if death 
results when he attempts abortion. 
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Malice as an essential characteristic of the 
crime of murder may be either express or implied. 
An intent to kill, or the existence of pre-
meditation or deliberation, or the existence of any 
other mental state beyond that embraced within the 
concept of malice aforethought is not required to 
constitute murder at common law. Such an additional 
mental state is required to constitute first degree 
murder, 
AFORETHOUGHT 
The element found in aforethought in "malice 
aforethought" requires merely that the act which 
causes the homicide be committed while the actor had 
a mental state of malice. It is sufficient that 
malice existed at the time of the commission of the 
act and it is immaterial how long it existed before. 
The fact that malice aforethought means merely 
that malice must exist at the same time as the act, 
in effect makes "aforethought" meaningless surplusage, 
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since the requirement is satisfied by the presence 
of malice or "concurrent" malice, rather than an 
antecedent malice. The unimportant character of the 
adjective "aforethought" is seen in the fact that in 
many opinions "malice" and "malice aforethought" are 
used interchangeably and that in many, "aforethought" 
is itself omitted. 
EXPRESS MALICE 
Express malice is defined as an intent either to 
kill or do serious bodily harm or with reckless dis-
regard of the consequences of the act, to do any cruel 
act which results in death. It is not material that 
the malice be directed toward the actual victim. If 
while doing an act with express malice directed to 
one person, the actor accidentlly kills anather person, 
he is guilty of murder to the same extent as though he 
had directed his act toward the actual victim. Nor is 
it necessary that malice be directed at any particular 
victim. Thus if a man throws from a roof into a 
~ 
,J 
~ 
~ 
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crowded street, where persons are constantly passing 
and repassing, a heavy piece of timber, calculated to 
produce death to such as it might strike, and death 
ensues, the offense is murder at common law. 
It is well settled that when a person intentionally 
discharges a firearm into a crowd of people, with a 
disregard of consequences, and a death results there-
from, he is guilty of murder. The defendant is also 
guilty of murder, although he did not intend to kill, 
when death results from his act when he intentionally 
discharges a firearm without a specific intent to 
inflict injury, but under such circumstances as to 
evince a heart regardless of social duty, and the act 
naturally tends to destroy human life; when he inten-
tionally discharges a firearm into a dwelling house in 
which he has reason to believe there are people living; 
or into a railroad train, or a closed, occupied auto-
mobile; or when he maliciously puts an obstruction on 
a railway track. 
-13-
IMPLIED MALICE 
Confusion exists as to the meaning of implied 
malice. Some courts make the distinction between 
express malice as that which is expressly stated by 
words or which is proved by direct evidence, and 
implied malice which is inferred from the evidence 
in all other cases. 
Generally, however, implied malice may be 
regarded as the equivalent of the phrase "constructive 
malice". That is, malice as such does not exist but 
the law regards the circumstances of the act as so 
harmful that the law punishes the act as though malice 
did in fact exist. 
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
FRISK SEARCH 
The very great value of the frisk search for 
weapons, now permitted in specified circumstances, 
has again been illustrated in two murders of young 
police officers in this State. In a time when drug-
oriented violence is commonplace, another review of 
the Terry case and its teachings could save police 
lives in the future. 
In plain language, Terry holds that when a police 
officer faces a situation that requires investigation, 
he has the right to search suspects for weapons only 
••. even though he might not have the right to arrest 
at that point •.. if the facts justify a belief that the 
suspects might be armed. The frisk search has nothing 
to do with evidence, and should be limited to action 
designed to protect the officer (and others) against 
violence during the investigation. 
-15 .. 
Following is language from the United States 
Supreme Court relating to the right of a police 
officer to conduct an investigatory frisk search 
for weapons .•• Terry v. Ohio, 20 Led 2d 889: 
WHEN FRISK JUSTIFIED 
"When an officer is justified in believing that 
the individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed and presently 
dangerous to the officer or to others, it would 
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer 
the power to take necessary measures to determine 
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and 
to neutralize the threat of physical harm." 
FRISK SEARCH DEFINED 
"A search for weapons in the absence of probable 
cause to arrest .•• must .•• be strictly circumscribed by 
the exigencies which justify its initiation. Thus it 
~ 
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must be limited to that which is necessary for the 
discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the 
officer or others nearby, and may realistically be 
characterized as something less than a 'full' search, 
even though it remains a serious intrusion. 
" ••. a perfectly reasonable apprehension of danger 
may arise long before the officer is possessed of 
adequate information to justify taking a person into 
custody for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime. 
"The officer need not be absolutely certain that 
the individual (suspect) is armed; the issue is whether 
a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be 
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of 
others was in danger." 
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LIMITS OF FRISK SEARCH 
"The sole justification of the (frisk) search .•• 
is the protection of the police officer and others 
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to 
an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the 
assault of the police officer." 
FRISK SEARCH ... CONCLUSION 
"We .•. hold today that where a police officer 
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal 
activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom 
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, 
where in the course of investigating this behavior 
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reason-
able inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages 
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear 
for his own and others' safety, he is entitled for the 
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protection of himself and others in the area to 
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer 
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover 
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a 
search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and 
any weapons seized may properly be introduced in 
evidence against the person from whom they were taken." 
FRISK SEARCH NEED 
NOT BE DELAYED! ! 
" .•. a limited frisk (search) incident to a law-
ful stop must often be rapid and routine. There is no 
reason why an officer, rightfully .•• confronting a 
person suspected of a serious crime, should have to 
ask (even) one question and take the risk that the 
answer might be a bullet." (Justice Harlan, concurring.) 
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GENERAL COMMENTS FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK 
In order to justify a frisk search, the police 
officer must have reasonable grounds for stopping the 
subject. Such grounds need not amount to probable ~: .~ ~ 
cause to arrest, but they must be something more than 
a desire to question. There must be some fact that 
justifies the officer in forcibly detaining the subject 
for brief, investigatory questioning. Terry frisk 
search for weapons is lawful when: 
1. The officer has reasonable cause to think a 
situation warrants investigation. 
2. The circumstances justify a suspicion that the 
suspect(s) might be armed. 
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FLEMING'S NOTEBOOK ... Chapter 99: 
Another criminal conviction (receiving stolen 
goods .•• sentence 10 years) has been reversed by the 
South Carolina Supreme Court because an informer 
search warrant did not contain sufficient facts in 
the affidavit ..• Statev. Harrell (SC), filed March 21, 
1974. 
A search warrant was issued by a magistrate upon 
an 'informer' affidavit, and the stolen goods sought 
were found. The goods were introduced in evidence at 
trial. The defendant was convicted and sentence of 
ten years was imposed. Appeal to the State Supreme 
Court was taken on the ground that the search warrant 
was invalid. 
The affidavit signed by the investigating police 
officer was approximately as follows, with formal 
parts deleted: 
"Personally appeared (name of officer), who, being 
duly sworn, says that he has good reason to believe 
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that (name of suspect) has concealed on his premises 
at or near (description and location of trailer) a 
quantity of stolen goods (description of goods). 
"And that the facts tending to establish the 
foregoing for issuance of a search warrant are as 
follows: Within the past forty-eight hours, (name of 
officer) was informed by a reliable informant that 
the above property was seen at the above described 
trailer or within his motor vehicle. 
"Deponent has good reason to believe that the 
information submitted to him by a reliable informant 
is believeable because informant is known by officer 
to be a reliable, dependable person." 
Associate Justice Woodrow Lewis, who wrote the 
opinion reversing the conviction, said: 
"We agree that the •.• affidavit upon which the .. 
.. search warrant was issued was deficient .•. , and that 
the search of the ..• trailer ..• was illegal .... The 
evidence obtained from the trailer pursuant to the ... 
search was, therefore, inadmissable and prejudicial." 
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With slight additions, the affidavit would have 
been lawful and the conviction would not have been 
reversed. Using the same words as the subject 
affidavit as nearly as possible, such affidavit 
could have been made sufficient and lawful had it 
been worded as follows, for example: 
WHY IS THE INFORMER 
THOUGHT TO BE RELIABLE? 
"Deponent has good reason to believe that the 
information submitted to him by an informer is 
believeable because such informer has been known to 
the affiant for two years, such informer has given 
similar information to the affiant and other officers 
of his Department on other occasions during that 
period of time, and such information has proven 
generally, to be reliable." 
COMMENT: The affidavit in the Harrell case 
stated only that the informer was reliable and depend-
able. It did not state why the officer concluded that 
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he was reliable. The example set out above gives 
facts upon which the officer bases his opinion that 
his informer is reliable. 
WHAT DID THE INFORMER SAY HE 
SAW OR HEARD TO CONVINCE HIM 
THAT THE GOODS SOUGHT WERE AT 
THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED? 
"And the facts tending to establish the fore-
going for issuance of a Search Warrant are as follows: 
Within the past forty-eitht hours, (name of officer) 
was informed by such informer that the property 
described above was seen by him at the trailer 
described, on Thursday, (date)." 
COMMENT: The affidavit in the Harrell case says 
simply that the informer said that the goods were seen 
at the suspect premises. It does not say who saw the 
goods. The example, on the other hand, states that the 
informer himself saw the goods, and gives the date upon 
which he saw them. 
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INFORMER AFFIDAVIT RULE 
I. State why the informer is thought be be reliable. 
II. State what the informer saw or heard to make him 
believe that the contraband or stolen goods are 
in the suspect premises. 
III. State approximately when the informer saw or 
heard such things. 
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